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Introduction for: 
MULLIGAN 
At Fordham Law, students often debate the roles that 
judicial restraint and judicial activism should play in our legal 
system. Supporters of judicial activism argue that an innovative 
judiciary is essential to clearly define and protect individual 
rights in a world far more complex than that of the founding 
fathers. Opponents of judicial activism criticize the doctrine 
as anti-democratic, because unelected judges can substitute their 
judgments for those of a popularly elected legislature. From 
Constitutional Law classes to late afternoon meetings of the 
Federalist Society, debate over the costs and benefits of 
judicial activism occurs almost daily in the safe halls of our 
law school. 
Outside law school halls, the debate is not always safe. 
For California Superior Court Judge Howard Broadman, an activist 
sentence he i~posed in January 1991 almost cost him his life. 
When a mother plead guilty to child abuse, Judge Broadman 
conditioned her probation in part on acceptance of a surgically 
implanted contraceptive device. Judge Broadman's sentence drew 
volleys of praise and criticism from all over the country. Two 
months later in his courtroom, a self-proclaimed holy warrior 
against contraception pulled out a gun and fired at the judge's 
head. Judge Broadman was not hit, but the assassination attempt 
stands as an extreme example of the stress judicial activism can 
place on the legal system. 
Judge William Hughes Mulligan's Sennett Lecture examines 
the roles of judicial activism and judicial restraint in the 
context of Cruel and Unusual punishment cases. Judge Mulligan 
analyzes the workings of the ''proportionality principle", a 
feature of eighth amendment jurisprudence that allows a federal 
court to strike down a punishment that is, in its judgment, 
excessively severe. Judge Mulligan's topic illuminates the 
difficulties experienced by the judicial branch when it sets 
aside a punishment approved by the legislature. 
Judge Mulligan's conclusion, that federal courts should 
def er to the state legislatures on the proper length of sentences 
for criminal offenses, is particularly relevant in today's "get 
tough on crime'' environment. As the national war on drugs wages 
on, individual states lengthen sentences, build more prisons, and 
create alternative methods of punishing criminals. Military-
style boot camps and electronic tracking devices used to enforce 
house arrest are just two examples of recent innovations in the 
fight against crime. Sooner or later, many of these and other 
measures will be challenged on constitutional grounds. Judge 
Mulligan's support for the legislature's role is important; his 
analysis will help to dispose of the weaker of these challenges 
while preserving the Court's status as protector of eighth 
amendment rights. 
come to be entertained 
are doomed to disappointment. This paper is devoted 
to the subject of cruel and unusual punishment and you 
may well be subjected to it this evening. Since the 
fifty footnotes take up less space than the text, I 
toyed with the idea of reading them instead. · However, 
my law clerks felt that although the text was not that 
great it was probably ~ore understandable than the 
footnotes. This paper was the result of my writing 
Carmona v. Ward which involved an attack on the 
Constitutionality of the New York Penal Law provisions 
mandating lifetime parole terms in certain drug dealing 
convictions. The New York Courts had unamimously upheld the 
constitutionality of the law as applied in those cases -
3 appellate divisions had ruled and finally the New York 
Court of Appeals. In the Southern District Court the 
statute was held unconstitutional and the Second Circuit 
reversed 2 to 1. The Supreme Court earlier this month denied 
certiorari 7 to 2 - Judges Marshall and Powell dissenting. 
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put aside and I would read you instead a chapter on 
Offer or Acceptance according to Calamari and Perillo. 
I am thankful to my current law clerks Mike 
Malone and Mary Anne Wirth for their assistance and 
cribism and primarily of course to Charles Carberry 
who worked closely with me on Carmona. All three are 
graduates of the great Fordham Law School, of course . 
.. 
The Sennett Lecture 
Fordham University Scbric.,J r, f 1 . .i ·~; 
January 30, 1979 
"Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The Proportionality Rule" 
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides in the usual stark and unadorned constituional 
prose "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive "~ 
(:j fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punislunents inflicted.' 
The constitutional restriction binds both the legislative and 
judicial branches of the federal government and through the 
2) 
Fourteenth Amendment is applicable to the states as well. 
While both branches are governed by the constitutional limita-
. tion, our system of judicial review .provides an enormous 
potential power for the federal judiciary to strike down 
sentences presUJl'l.ably fixed by state legislatures as appro-
priate sanctions reflecting the judgment of their constituencies 
as to the seriousness of particular criminal offenses. 
This paper is primarily concerned with only one 
aspect of the "cruel and unusual" clause--the so-called 
proportionality principle which simply expressed is that a 
punishment ,.;hich is grossly or excessively severe in relaticn-
ship to the gravity of the crime charged must be struck down 
by the courts as ,,violative of the Eighth Amendment. Even··, ~ · · · 
3) 
before Gilbert and Sullivan's Mikado, it had been an article 
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of popular faith that the punishment fit the crime. In 
American jurisprudence however this is deemed to be the 
responsibility of the legislature which created the crime 
and fixed the sanction. Only recently has it become recog-
nized that punishment grossly in excess of the gravity of 
the offense may offend the Constitution of the United States. 
I will briefly review the history of the principle and the test 
which has been developed to apply it. I will suggest some 
inherent weaknesses and dangers in the test and indicate the 
balancing of principles which must be employed in applying 
it lest it become a device for the imposition of judicial 
concepts of criminal punishment in the guise of constitutional 
interpretation. 
The history of the cruel and unusual punishment 
4) 
clause has been set forth in several law review articles 
5) 
and in expansive judicial opinions. There is no need to 
present it in detail here. 
The phrase~tsel~ and unusual punishments", 
first appeared in the English Bill of Rights of 1689 which 
prohibited such sanctions. Historians generally have 
... · ;,· 
perceived the prohibition to be a reaction to the treason 
trials of 1685--the ."Bloody Assize" caused by the abortive 
. ::. -,:~ 
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rebellion of the Duke of Monmouth. The penalty for treason 
committed by a man involved hanging by the neck, to be cut 
down while still alive and then disembowelled, beheaded and 
6) 
quartered. I omit some of the more grisly details. 
That the methods of punishment employed by the English 
then and later were cruel and barbarous by today's standards 
is quite apparent. 
There is another view which has gained some accept-
ance that the phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" was inserted 
in the English Bill of Rights not simply as an interdiction 
of barbarous methods of punishment but also to prohibit 
sentences which were disproportionate to the gravity of the 
crime conunitted. One theory is that the conviction of the 
infamous Titus Oates for perjury in 1685 and his subsequent 
sentence support the proposition that a sentence disproportionate 
to the crime was cruel and unusual within the meaning of the 
Bill of Rights. 
In 1679 Oates had sworn that he was present at a 
meeting where a group of influential Catholic laymen and 
Jesuit priests had plotted to murder the Protestant King 
Charles II and to place his brother James, a Catholic, 
-
-· . ... .::: ..... -- . . -~ "' . ..;::::- - .;. 
upon the throne. 
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Oatcc who had a vivid ima~ination provided certain 
lurid details--the Jesuits were to kill the King with silver 
bullets and if that failed four Irish Ruffians were to stab 
him to death. As a reEult of the alleged "Popish Plot", 
panic prevailed in London and as a result of Oates' 
testimony a score of innocent Catholics were executed in 
the manner heretofore described. James II eventually did 
ascend the throne, evidence of Oates' perjury became over-
whelming and in 1685 he was convicted of perjury; sentenced to 
prison for life, severely flogged, fined, placed in a 
pillory four times a year and defrocked as a Minister of 
the Church of England. After the revolution of 1688, the 
flight of James II and the ascension to the throne of 
l·~illiam and Mary of Orange, Oates was not only pardoned but 
even given a lifetime pension. 
An influential law review article which has espouse 
the view that "cruel and unusual punishments" should be 
equated with the disproportionality of the sentence and not 
simply the barbarity of the method of punishment, argued 
that Oates' sentence was cruel and unusual not because of 
which were 
the flogging and pillaring/normal methods of punishment 
..... - 4-
,. 
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those days but because a term of life imprisonment was dis-
7) 
proportionate to the crime of perjury. This argument in 
my view is, unpersuasive both logically and historically. 
Oates' perjury has led directly to the barbaric execution of 
some 21 innocent Catholics including seven Jesuits, one of 
8) 
whom was the provincial of the English Society. Winston 
· Churchill hardly an Angla._phob~ in his discussion of the 
"Popish Plot" describes Oates as "being as wicked as any man 
9) 
·who ever lived." The usual punishment for perjury 
10) 
included "branding or tongue boring, or both". 
Oates' sentence viewed in the light of contemporary 
penological practices was neither cruel or unusual. His 
eventual release and reward by William of Orange was not 
due to any belief that he had been subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishment but as described by a modern biographer of 
Oates, it was "as an act of gratitude by William of Orange 
who knew his friends and recognized the instruments which 
11) 
helped him attain the throne of England." While Titus 
Oates was a fascinating as well as frightening character, 
l do not believe his sentence casts any light upon the 
meaning of the phrase cruel and unusual nor does it support 
the proportionality principle. 
.:.·-· .=· l -'\ ·~ 
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In 1791 the same phrase "cruel and unusual punish-
ments" was adopted with little debate as part of the Eighth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. It is quite 
clear that the framers intended to outlaw barbarous punish-
ments. The first Eighth Amendment cases to come before the 
Supreme Court established that punishments involving torture 
or lingering death which were acceptable to our Anglo 
Saxon legal forbears, were cruel and unusual under the inter-
12) jL-~~~~~~~~~~~-
diction of the Eighth Amendment. f n In rs Kemmler, 136 
U.S. 436, 447 (1890) the Court held that death by electrocu-
tion was not cruel and unusual under either the New York or 
United States Constitutions. 
The question as to whether a term of .ir:':priscr.rnent 
could be so excessively disproportionate to the offense so 
as tc be within the Eighth Amendment was not addressed in the 
Supreme Court until 1892 and then only in dicta in a dissenting 
144 U.S. 323, 
opinion. In O'Neil v. Vermont~jthe defendant, who was licensed 
to sell liquor in New York, had been sentenced to 19,914 days 
the 
(over 54 years) for conviction on 307 counts of/illegal sale 
of liquor shipped to Vermont. The majority did not reach the 
question of whether the penalty violated the Eighth .Amendment 
'- . - .. -
13) .:... .- : .2- -~ .,__ . . ::.~ . . . . 
since that point· had not been raised as error. However, 
!· 
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in his disce:nting opinion Mr. Justice Fic.:ld, considering the 
fact that the penalty was more harsh than could have been 
imposed for burglary or manslaughter, concluded that "[i]t 
was one which, in its severity, considering the offences 
of which [the defendant] was convicted, may justly be 
14) 
termed· both unusual and cruel." 
In 1910 the Suprell1e Court decided Weems v. United 
15) 
States which is now regarded as the seminal case with 
J 
respect to the proportionality principle. The defendant, an 
official of the Philippine goverrunent, was convicted of 
falsifying public records and was sentenced under the Penal 
Code of the Philippines, then a United States territory, to 
15 years cf hare and pa inf u 1 labor, ·1.-i th a c!:.::..in at the 
ankle hanging from the wrists. Ee was stri~ped cf the right 
of parental authority, guardianship of person or property, 
participation in the family council, marital authority, the 
administration of property and the right to dispose cf his 
property. He was placed under surveillance by the state 
for the rest of his life, could not vote, hold office, 
receive retire.rne~t pay or even change his re:=iaer:ce \·:i thou:: 
16} 
permission. Only six judges participated in this 
-·.~ 
i: 
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decision and two, White and Ilolmes, dissented. The majority 
found that this punishment was "cruel in its excess of 
imprisonment and that which accompanies and follows imprison-
ment. It is unusual in its character. Its punishments come 
under the condemnation of the bill of rights, both on account 
,,17) 
of their degree and kind. (Emphasis supplied). The Court 
was repulsed by the nature of the penalty as well as its 
the 
lack of proportion to/seriousness of the underlying crime. 
Thus, the Co~rt cc~pared the punishment of the defendant to 
those imposed in the same jurisdiction for crimes which the 
Court considered to be more serious than the one for v;hich 
18) 
the defendant had been convicted. It also compared the 
punishment unc:ier attack v:ith those irr~posec in ether juris-
19) 
cictions for the same crime. These two steps have become 
20) 
major parts of the contemporary proportionality test. 
While the language of Weems does suppcrt the doctrine 
of proportionality, it must be remembered that the Court was 
considering not simply a 15 year prison term but one accom-
panied by npainful labor" in chains, lifetime supervision and 
civil interdiction. It is difficult indeed to believe that 
the Supreme Court would have held a 15 year term of imprison-
l -
ment unconstitutional had it not been for the barbarous l ~~-~T 
I 
l -
21) 
terms which accompanied and, indeed, followed its service. 
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Weems is an important decision in any event because 
of its affirmation of two principles of Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence, the first of which is indeed basic and the 
second almost obvious. The first is as the Court stated: 
[T]here is a certain subordination of the 
judiciary to the legislature. The function 
of the· legislature is primary, its exercises 
fortified by presumptions of right and legality, 
and it is not to be interfered ~ith lightly, 
nor by any judicial conception of their 
wisdom or propriety. They have no limitation, 
we repeat, but constitutional ones, and what those 
22) 
are the judiciary must judge. 
The second is that the Eighth Amendment prohibition 
23) 
is evolutionary in nature. This principle was succinctly 
formulated by Chief Justice Warren: "The Amendment must dra,·.' 
its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark 
24) 
the progress of a maturing society." I believe that there 
may well be some question as to whether we Americans have, 
in general espoused higher standards of decency and ~hether 
"!:~ 
·· : ·_~ 
our society is becoming more instead of less mature. Nonetheless 
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in the context of cri1r1ir1i..tl ~i.lr1ctions no one cun scriou~ly I 
contest the proposition that the physical and mental human tGrture, I 
I 
degradation and loss of personal dignity acceptable to the 
Sassenach or the Sioux have long since been rejected, at least 
in democratic societies. Hence it is beyond doubt that what 
was an acceptable sanction at the time of the adoption of 
the Constitution is hardly permissible today and forms no 
basis for judicial inquiry to determine Constitutional 
criteria. 
What is significant is that since 1·:eerns was decideC. 
in 1910 there has been no opinion in the Supre.-:ie Court i·:hic:-_ 
has struck down a non-capital punisrunent on proportionality 
grounds. Indeed, since then there has been only one ether 
case in which a majority of that Court founC. that a · ncn-ca ~ ~ ~~l 
penalty violated the cruel and unusual p~~islli~ent clause. 
25) 
Robinson v. California, as noted by Chief Judge KaufrnaP. -~ 
26) 
a prior Sennett Lecture the Court ruled that a person cou:~ 
not be convicted of a crime simply because he suffered fr c ~ . 
condition or status of being addicted to a narcotic drug. 
~lthough the two are often confused, whe~her a certain 
should be a crime and whether the punishment should fit t~e 
27) 
crime are entirely separate inquiries. 
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Throughout the present decade the Supreme Court 
has struggled with the apparently intractable problem of 
28) 
capital punishment. A judge must be careful in applying 
these precedents, in which a majority opinion is rare and 
which involve the ultimate irrevocable sanction to cases 
involving much different considerations because of the lesser 
29) 
penalties involved. However, from the opinions in the 
death penalty cases two propositions are clear. One is that 
the Supreme Court accepts the principle of proportionality as 
30) 
constitutionally mandated. The other is that there is a 
strong presumption that the legislative penalty is valid 
because "the constitutional test is intertwined with an assess-
ment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgr..ent 
31) 
weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards." 
Whether or not the proportionality concept was ~ithin 
the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause of the Bill of 
Rights of 1689 or in the minds of the founding fathers when 
the Eighth Amendment was adopted is really academic. It has 
the I now been espoused in principle by the Supreme Court, 
32) 
33) 
New York Court of Appeals as well as a large number of 
. .. ·~ 
-- - 3 4) 
State Courts~~-
I-
t 
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The cases have developed a generally accepted three 
pronged test to determine whether a sentence is so excessively 
disproportionate to the r~;m~ that it violates the Eighth 
Amendment. The three steps are--f irst, a judgment by the 
court of the gravity of the offense. Second--a comparison of 
the sentence under review with that imposed in the same 
j ur,isO.icticn for otLr:r er i :r.,r:s 1·.'h ich the cc.iurt considers to b r: 
more serious; and third--a comparison of the challenged 
sentence with those ir.,posed in other jurisdictions for the 
35) 
same crime. There is even authority that the comparison can 
36) 
include the penalties imposed by foreign nations. 
The aim of the test is to reduce the input of judi-
cial subj ecti vi ty in Eighth Amendment j ur is prudence. i·7hile c. 
th!:ee pronged test f 2ci2lly phrased .:..!'. ob j e :-ti '.re ter.:-.s is 
to be lightly discarded (and I suppose must be viewed with 
more respect than a two pronged test,) I am frankly becoming 
less and less convinced that the proportionality rubric is 
of any real value in cases where the only claim is that the 
Eighth Amendment has been violated sir..ply because of the 
length of the term imposed. There is no case in fact in 
l 
I 
i i 
I 
I 
I 
i. 
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either the Suprem~ Court, the S8cond Circuit, or th0 New 
York Court of Appeals where a sentence has ever been set aside 
37) 
for this reason even though the test has been accepted. 
This is because Weems itself has emphasized the great deference 
which must be paid to the state legislature. As Chief Justice 
Marshall pointed out in 1820, "It is the legislature, not the 
38) 
court, which is to define a crime, . and ordain its punishment." 
Mr. Justice Ste>·; art has recently er.:phasized "a heavy burden" 
rests on thost: ;:ho would attack the judgment of the ::repre-
39) 
sentatives of the people. 
The first prong of the test requires the court to 
r..a}:e a jUC'.:J'T.1ent as to the seriousness of the crime charged 
and this of course invites the substitution of the subjective 
40) 
views of the judge for that o~ the legislature. The 
concern here is both constitutional and practical. We must 
observe the doctrine of separation of powers as well as 
41) 
federalism. This emphasizes the need for judicial restraint. 
A practical consideration of course is the institutional 
limitation. on judicial ' fact finding. The legislature, 
acting through commissions and co~J!littees with funds for 
- 111 -
counsel, staff and public hearings is patently better equipp~d 
than the judiciary to make the factual and social determinations 
42) 
which underlie any decision as to the gravity of a crime. 
It is also more attuned to contemporary community standards 
and can best judge the public's concern about particular 
43) 
criminal activity. 
The second prong of the test is even more vulnerable 
since it calls for a comparison by the judicial branch of 
the statutory sentence ir.;posed for the crime ccrn."Tli tted with 
those imposed for more serious offenses in the same juris-
diction. The problem of determining the gravity of a particular 
crime is di ff icul t enough ·with out having to make judgments 
~bcut other crimes. It is rather simple to make a decision 
that smoking in the subway is not as serious as rape. But 
ccmparing the crimes and punis~~eno for arson and kidnapping, 
automobile larceny and drunken driving requires the digestion 
. sociowgical 
of a vast amount of penological and~ aat~ not usually 
available to the jurist. The ccrnparions cannot be mechanically 
applied and the danger of the judicial substitution of its 
judgment on a social issue fer that of the legislature charge~ 
. :.,,_ 
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with the responsibility of making the decision initially, 
is apparent. 
The third step of the proportionality test requires 
the court to compare the sentence under review with those 
imposed in other jurisdictions for the same crime. This is 
the least susceptible to misuse as a tool facilitating the 
substitution of individual judicial policy views for those 
c f the legislature. At t h e s ame time, it is f l awed a nd 
is basically antagonistic to the principles of federalism. 
The Supreme Court has recognized for example that there is 
no national standard for obscenity and that the courts are 
44) 
to apply local corrununity standards. Yet this leads to 
the anomaly that while a jury is required to apply local 
standards in determining whether or not an act is crirr.inally 
cbs cene, nationa l s tandards are enc ourage~ to b e con sidere~ 
in determining whether the punishment is constitutional. 
The rationale supporting the distinction of using local 
standards to determine whether a First Amendment violation has 
occurred but C11.. natio~standard to decide whether an Eighth 
Ainendment infraction has transpired, is not at all clear . 
• ._.!::lt"" ·.~ -:. : :... . • . - i ... :s 
i -
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The use of the standards of f orcign ncitions to 
determine the constitutionality of punishment seems to be 
generally of little or no help. Aside from differing moral, 
social and cultural standards, I would suspect that a few 
years in a dungeon in some foreign climes can hardly be 
compared with incarceration in most modern American penal 
institutions. 
In any event, a state may be faced with a 
particularly virulent type of criminal activity and I submit 
it should have some latitude in determining a strategy to 
combat that crime and one means may be the i~position of a 
longer sentence. In Carmona v. Ward, the most recent case 
in our circuit to c haller.ge a prison terr.. as u:r,ccns::.itu~ionc:.l 
because of its length, we held it to be significant, as had 
the New York Court of Appeals, that New York had a particularly 
45) 
acute drug problem. The State legislature in 1967 had 
embarked upon a penal law approach which emphasized treatment 
cf the addict and not incarceration. Six years and over 1 
billion dollars later, the Legislature determined that the 
progra~ was not successful anc adopted admitte~ly stern 
46) 
measures with life time maximum prison terms. It is not 
r--- ~ - . ! .:=-~­
.. ..:· .d · :,;.,;.t~ .-J•f."P~ 
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for the courts to determine the wisdom or effectiveness of 
the program. It has engendered criticism and it may well 
not be working. But the Legislature has already made changes 
and is clearly in the best position to make more. 
tpe drug statute not to be violative of the Constitutio ,....;;.-~-
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari--7-2 earlier this 
48) 
In conclusion I \·;ould pcint out that a prison tern 
so cispr0portionate in length in comparison with the gravity 
of the crime so as to shock the conscience should be held 
to be cruel and unusua1 under the Eighth Amendment of the 
Ccnsituticn. ~his is so not because it was in the ~ind c~ ~~ ~ 
framers of the English Bill of Rights in 1689 either because 
of the Bloody Assize or the trial of Titus Oates and not 
because the founding fathers had it in ~ind i~ adopting the 
language of the prior act. What books Jefferson may have 
read hardly supports the inference that he believed the 
maxim "let the punishment fit the crime" was of constitutionc.~ 
dimension. Nor do I believe that a lone dissent in O'Neil 
v. Vermont or the majority opinion in Weems \·;hich involveC. 
barbarous treatment necessarily preordained acceptan~e of 
. · . . - ~ · .--. 
·J . 
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proportionality principle. I sc~ no reuson~ to ~train or 
struggle with doubtful historical or judicial precedent 
to establish the point. Since barbarous methods of punish-
ment have generally disappeared, unless the Eighth Amendment 
is to become totally moribund and the phrase simply a 
shibboleth, it must apply to extraordinarily excessive 
terms. This we accept because as we have indicated the dause 
is evolutionary in character and not because the Founding 
rathers had it in mind. 
However, I also believe that state legis-
latures usually co net act aberrantly and are normally 
responsive to and reflect community standards. Unlike 
~ederal judges wh o serve for life, the legislatcr ~ust 
ansv.1er to his ccnsti tu ency after relatively brief terr::s 
of office. The deference we must pay the legislative 
determination is due not only to constitutional concepts 
because of 
of separation of powers and federalism but/the institutional 
difficulty of the judiciary making the social, moral and 
perological decisions inherent in the test which has 
t e en constructed. I believe it is of some significance that 
in the most recent federal case in point the Fourth Circuit, 
• J 
- . 
, 
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49) 
which had initially employed the proportionulity test; 
has now refused to apply it at least where the sentence is 
for a term of years. It will set aside such a term which is 
within the states statutory maxim only where there are 
50) 
"extraordinary and special circumstances." 
So called judicial activists of course will maintain 
that the refusal to set aside admittedly harsh sentences 
constitutes an abdication of our constitutional mandate. But 
this requires an uncerstanding of what . cur constitutiona.l 
really 
mandate/is. From the foregoing discussion, I submit that 
our responsibility is narrow indeed. Aside from the legis-
la-tive deterninc::tion r.iade by a state in casPS v;here the state 
juC.iciary which has taken an oath to uphold the same Constituticr:. 
as we have, has itself found the state statute nor to be 
constitutionally defective, the role of the federal judiciary 
becomes even less active. 
I think the significant factor is judicial restraint. 
I recall to you the Justice Frankfurter elegant articulation 
of the point: 
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[T]herc i~ not under our Constitution a 
judicial remedy for every political mischief, 
for every undesirable exercise of legislative 
power. In a democratic society like ours, 
relief must come through an aroused popular 
conscience that sears the conscience of the 
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